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Estimating the Impact of Medication on Diabetics’ Diet and Lifestyle Choices 
 
Introduction 
Often repeated diet and health recommendations from the public health community are to 
increase consumption of fruits and dark green leafy vegetables, reduce intake of added sugars, 
trans-fats, saturated fats, cholesterol, salt, and alcohol while maintaining bodyweight by aligning 
caloric intake with one’s level of physical activity.  The impetus for such advice is that scientific 
evidence suggests obesity leads to an increased risk of premature death, type II diabetes, heart 
disease, stroke, hypertension, gallbladder disease, osteoarthritis, and many other maladies (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2001). Regardless, recent statistics on obesity and 
dietary intake show that the majority of Americans are far from complying with this advice: the 
majority of Americans are overweight; approximately one third are obese; and the average diet is 
too high in calories, added sugars and saturated fat.  To meet the 2005 Dietary Guidelines, the 
typical American would need to more than double their current intake of vegetables and whole-
grain foods while halving their intake of solid fats and added sugars (Hedley, et al., 2004; United 
States Department of Health and Human Services and United States Department of Agriculture, 
2005). 
 
This increasing prevalence of obesity and diet-related illnesses begs the question why so many 
people are putting themselves at risk of such serious illnesses.  There must be something that 
compensates for accepting such risks—a tradeoff that makes the risks worth accepting.  Clearly, 
many Americans still eat too much food and choose those that are too high in fat, salt refined 
grains and added sugar.  Given these strong preferences, the task the public health community   3
has set for itself—changing American’s diets—is extremely difficult.  Here, we offer a 
quantitative perspective on just how difficult it will be to realize a substantial improvement.  We 
focus attention on the subset of consumers who have strong incentives to choose a healthful diet, 
those who have been diagnosed with diabetes, and show that they embrace opportunities to resist 
any change. 
 
In this paper, we first provide some background on diabetes in the United States, indicating how 
diet and risk preferences could lead to a variety of behavioral adjustments and concomitant 
health (or health risk) outcomes.  We offer a theoretical model that shows that if consumers treat 
diet and medication as substitutes in producing good health, consumers are unlikely to realize all 
the health benefits possible from diet and medication.  In fact, consumers may choose diets that 
pose health risks even larger than those incurred in undiagnosed states: diet quality for those on 
medication may be worse than those who do not have diet-related chronic diseases.  This study 
uses the most recent data sets from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey 1999-
2000 and 2001-2002 (for simplicity NHANES 1999-2002), which contain detailed information 
on dietary intake, medical conditions and whether an individual takes medication for such 
conditions.  We estimate how differences in dietary quality correlate with whether or not an 
individual has been diagnosed with diabetes, and whether or not an individual uses medication to 
manage his or her health condition.  By examining diet quality for those having a diet-related 
disease, we show that the threat of severe adverse health consequences (premature death, 
blindness, loss of limbs, kidney failure) can induce major improvements in diet quality 
(improvements from the perspective of the public health community, not consumers).  But the 
availability of medications that can also forestall the adverse health consequences of chronic   4
diet-related disease means that most consumers will compromise diet quality.  We examine the 
overshooting that occurs as people with diabetes rely on medication, compromising diet quality.  
We conclude with suggestions for new guidance for information policy. 
 
Background 
Over the past twenty-five years, the percent of Americans diagnosed with diabetes has nearly 
doubled.  According to 2005 estimates from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
seven percent of the American population now has diabetes (United States Department of Health 
and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005).  Complications from 
diabetes include heart disease, stroke, high blood pressure, blindness, kidney disease, 
amputations and premature death.  It is estimated that the risk of death among people with 
diabetes is about twice that of similar aged people without diabetes.  In 2002, the estimated total 
direct and indirect costs of diabetes were calculated to be 132 billion dollars (American Diabetes 
Association, 2003).  As diabetes is more likely to affect ethnic minorities and older adults, these 
statistics are likely to worsen as our population ages and becomes more diverse. 
 
Although these statistics are discouraging, individuals can reduce the negative effects of diabetes 
through fairly straightforward behavioral changes such as eating a healthful diet and increasing 
physical activity.  The same changes can prevent onset of the disease (American Diabetes 
Association, no date).  Economic theory predicts that individuals will choose to alter current 
behavior when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.  Thus, depending on the alignment of 
prices, income, beliefs about how current lifestyle influences future health, and preferences, an   5
individual may choose to remain sedentary, slightly overweight and eat too much of the wrong 
foods, knowing that such choices compromise health and longevity.  
 
The various theories about the benefits of risk regulation provide a framework for evaluating 
behavioral responses to a diabetes finding.  Dickie and Gerking (1997) identified four hypotheses 
about how people respond to changes in risk policies.  Technologists might extrapolate from 
laboratory experiments to forecast that the benefits of a new and  imposed technology would be 
fully realized.  Namely, no one would change behavior and everyone would thus exact all 
possible health benefits of the new technology.  Alternatively, people adapt to risk reducing 
innovations by becoming less vigilant about safety.  They listed three variations of this notion.  
Peltzman (1975) argued that a risk reducing technology lowers the cost of risky behavior and 
induces an increase in risky behavior.  The outcome of more risk taking could at least partially 
offset the benefits of the regulation.  Wilde (1982) postulated a target risk level so that 
behavioral change would exactly offset benefits of regulation, leaving no net change in health 
outcomes.  Viscusi (1992) suggested that people may overestimate the risk-reducing capability 
of required technologies.  This lulling effect could lead people to take more risks than before the 
risk-reducing technology was required.  Health outcomes could be worse.   
 
If a person were surprised by being told he is diabetic, then clearly he was overestimating his 
health status.  Usually such information is not given in isolation.  Doctors would likely issue a 
stern lecture about the importance of managing diet (making big changes) and taking more 
exercise.  The importance of medication would also be part of the lecture.  In effect, the newly-  6
revealed diabetic is given an arsenal of tools for mitigating the adverse health effects of diabetes, 
all of which diminish utility.   
 
One response to this package of information could be to strictly follow doctor’s orders: changing 
diet and lifestyle, and taking medication.  From the perspective of the public health community, 
such a strategy is the only rational response.  Anything else is more risky and more likely to 
compromise health.  That is, failing to make diet and lifestyle changes or failing to take 
medication would be considered costly from a health perspective. 
 
However, in an individual’s attempts to maximize overall well-being, desires for his familiar diet 
and lifestyle may compete against his desires to mitigate health risks from diabetes.  Diet and 
lifestyle choices reflect preferences conditioned by a lifetime of habit as well as by family and 
community traditions.  Undoing the force of habit and tradition is unlikely to be easy.  He may 
consider the prescribed diet and lifestyle changes to be somewhat substitutable for medication in 
reducing the probability of adverse health outcomes.  He might think that medication lowers the 
health cost (increased probability of an adverse outcome) of failing to make diet and lifestyle 
changes.  In this case, offsetting behavior is certain; the important question for forecasting a 
health outcome is how much offsetting behavior will occur?  If the protective effect of 
medication is assumed large while the pull of the familiar diet and lifestyle is strong, major diet 
and lifestyle changes are unlikely.  Some individuals might enjoy a large protective effect from 
medication.  But others might simply overestimate the protective effect and be lulled into 
believing that medication eliminates the health risks of diet and lifestyle choices.  
   7
Theoretical Model 
We begin with a standard model influenced by Becker (1965), Lancaster (1966) and Grossman 
(1972)  of consumer demand that assumes individuals gain utility from behaviors (B), health (H) 
and all other goods (C).  For our purposes, behaviors over which utility is defined are selecting a 
nutritionally poor diet and having a sedentary lifestyle.  These are exactly opposite to the dietary 
and lifestyle choices that diabetics are typically encouraged to make: limit consumption of sugar, 
fat, and cholesterol and maintain at least a moderate level of physical activity (American 
Diabetes Association, no date; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2005).  Such recommendations may be difficult to follow 
because, though they offer long-term health benefits, they may also entail an immediate cost, 
such as foregoing dessert or spending 30 minutes on a tread-mill instead of watching TV.  
 
However, as long as good health enters the utility function, the health-compromising 
(undesirable) attributes of behaviors also influence the utility maximization.  Define H as a 
perceived health production function.  For simplicity, we assume that individuals manage health 
through behaviors and medication (M).  Also, we assume that how highly an individual assesses 
his or her current level of health is driven by η , a parameter that represents medical evidence of 
a current health condition.  For example, someone who was told that he or she had type II 
diabetes would assess his or her health at a lower level than before learning this news.  Thus, 
there is an inverse relationship between H and η .  Other goods (C) are assumed to have no direct 
impact on health. 
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Maximizing utility subject to the income constraint and to the health production function can be 
written in standard form as  
) ), ; , ( , ( max C M B H B U η  
I C M P B P t s M B ≤ + + . . . 
Thus the Lagrangian for this optimization problem can be written as follows: 
). ( ) ), ; , ( , ( C M P B P I C M B H B U L M B − − − + = λ η  
Where I is income,  B P  and  M P  are the prices for behaviors and medication, and for simplicity, 
the price of all other goods, C, is defined as the numeraire. The first order conditions are 
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Solving 1a and 1b for λ and equating (or for UC through 1c) exhausts the budget constraint 1d 













That is, the marginal rate of substitution between behaviors and pharmaceuticals that offset the 
health cost of behaviors is equal to the price ratio.  The marginal utility of behaviors is a net 
concept as it includes the direct benefits as well as the health cost.   
 
Equation (2) can be rewritten as 
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As the function F is identically zero, the implicit function rule can be used to explore relations 
among variables in the perceived health production function and in the utility function. 
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Our goal is to sign the derivative 
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 for a typical individual, not all mathematically possible 
utility and production functions.  We make conventional assumptions that 
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That is, the marginal utilities are positive, and utility and production functions are concave.  The 
marginal product of medicine is positive, but behaviors that bring enjoyment are assumed 
unhealthful and information about health is assumed to be bad news, reducing perceived health 
status. 
. , for 0
and for 0







Conventional utility and production function assumptions, however, are not sufficient to sign the 
derivative.  In addition, cross partials must meet a test of reasonableness or plausibility.  We 
assume that  . 0 ≥ = HB BH U U   That is, bad behavior is more rewarding when in better health.  The 
equality allows for the possibility that the rewards from bad behavior are independent of health 
status.  We assume  . 0 , 0 , 0 = = ≤ ≥ BM MB B M H H H H η η   Medicine becomes more important 
(or of unchanged importance) to health when health news is bad, behaviors compromise health 
more (or compromise health equally) when health news is bad, and the efficacy of medicine is 
independent of poor diet and lifestyle choices.  The latter condition is equivalent to insulin’s   10




 is negative, indicating that the net effect of bad health news is to reduce 
behaviors that compromise health.  Individuals will adjust to bad health news by making 
healthier diet and lifestyle choices. 
 





 for a typical individual, we again rely on the implicit function 
theorem,  
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 is positive.  In 
effect, medicine makes it easier to return to behaviors that compromise health.  The impact of 
making health benefits possible from pharmaceuticals means that many will forego some, or all, 
of the possible health benefits.  They will make themselves better off by returning to less healthy 
diet and lifestyles. This means that some individuals will find they improve their overall well-
being by taking medication while also choosing diets and lifestyles that are less healthful than 
they would choose if they had to rely on diet and lifestyle alone to manage a diet-related disease. 
 





also reveals how unlikely are health impacts predicted from 
pharmaceutical trials alone.  A pharmaceutical company would be tempted to promote new 
medications (point to large health benefits), making epidemiological predictions by extrapolating   11
from such trials.  Large benefits are more likely if the company assumes that all the health 
benefits possible from pharmaceuticals would be realized.  Such a prediction would not allow for 
the possibility that individuals might adjust to the possibility of using medicine.  The prediction 
would assume that individuals do not make themselves better off by modifying their diet and 





.   
 
To achieve the company’s forecasts requires FM to be identically zero.  One could make 
assumptions that make FM identically zero. For example, if utility were linear in health and 
health were linear in medicine,  0 = ⇒ = HH H U k U and . 0 = ⇒ = MM M H l H   Adding the 





  But 
giving up concavity and the notion that medicine might command a positive price are extreme 
and unsupportable assumptions. 
 














relatively small compared to the absolute value of 
η ∂
∂B
, the overall response to bad health news 






rises relative to the magnitude, in absolute value, of 
η ∂
∂B
, the sum of the two 
partials approaches zero, and diet and exercise concerns diminish.  If the sum is zero, diet and 
lifestyle return to the level chosen before the bad news arrived.  In this case, the increased risk   12
taking by returning to old diet and exercise habits completely offsets the health benefits of 
medicine. 
 









That is, bad health 
news and the opportunity to mitigate adverse health effects with medication could have a 
decidedly negative effect on diet and lifestyle choices, leaving individuals with greater health 
risks than if they had not been diagnosed with a diet-related illness.  The shape and position of 
the perceived health production function allow for this possibility.  Health can be compromised 






H H − > .  While there is little intuition that can be offered for 
the second inequality, the first is straightforward.  The inequality suggests that medication is 
perceived to offer health benefits at the margin that are greater than the health decrement lost to 
bad health news.  That is, if medication offers to more-than-counteract the bad news, it opens the 




The theoretical model implies that dietary choices and level of physical activity will be a 
function of prices, health conditions and whether or not an individual takes medication to control 
these conditions. Analysis of the equilibrium conditions yields three hypotheses that can be 
tested empirically:    13
  There is a negative relationship between the being made aware of a health condition, such 
as diabetes, and specific behaviors, such as choosing to eat an unhealthful diet or being 
physically inactive; 
  There is a positive relationship between taking medication for a health condition and these 
same behaviors; and  
  The effect of medication on increasing behaviors may offset the reductive effect of better 
health awareness.  
The theoretical model suggests that an individual’s chosen level of behaviors ( i B ) can be 
modeled as a function of income, prices, and health status ( i H ) which, as defined in the 
theoretical model, is determined by one’s behaviors, awareness of a health condition ( i η ) and 
whether or not one takes prescribed medication ( i M ). This specification illuminates the 
simultaneous nature of behavioral choices, medication and health status. For simplicity (and data 
availability) we use a static framework. In reality, these decisions are more dynamic; past food 
and behavioral choices influence our current health status, which in turn influence our future 
choices regarding food, behaviors and medication. The empirical model can be written as: 
 (3a)  i i i i i e M X B + + + = φ δη β'   
(3b)  i i i Z M ε ξ + = , 
where  i X is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables that relate to individual behavioral 
choices, i η indicates whether or not an individual has a specific health condition,   i M  indicates 
whether or not an individual takes medication for this condition and i Z is a vector of exogenous 
explanatory variables relating to whether or not an individual chooses to manage his or her 
health condition through medication, and  i i e ε ,  are random disturbance terms. An estimation   14
approach that does not explicitly address this simultaneous process will bias the estimated 
relationship between behaviors, such as food intake or physical activity and the explanatory 
variables. For that reason, we estimate these two equations simultaneously using a treatment 
effects estimator. In the first equation, we run a probit regression to estimate whether an 
individual chooses to manage health via medication. In the second equation, we estimate the 
magnitude of diet and activity choices recommended to control diabetes. To obtain robust 
variance estimates, we use STATA 9.0 to control for survey sample weights and inter strata 
variation.  
 
Data and Results  
Data 
Since 1999, the NHANES data have been collected annually through the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention via the National Center for Health Statistics. Each year 5,000 civilian, 
noninstitutionalized persons in the U.S receive a thorough medical examination, provide a 24-
hour dietary recall, and answer questions related to health behaviors, such as dieting, physical 
activity, alcohol consumption and cigarette smoking. This survey is designed to be nationally 
representative and over-samples African Americans, Mexican Americans and individuals with 
low-income (United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, 2005). Using the Pyramid servings 
database, this survey can also be used to calculate the number of servings for each pyramid food 
group consumed over the 24-hour period (United States Department of Agriculture, 2006). For 
this study, we limit our analysis to adults, aged twenty and older
1. We exclude pregnant and 
                                           
1 Our analysis focuses on adults because most children do not have complete control over their food intake or level 
of physical activity.    15
lactating women since their dietary needs differ from the rest of the population. In total, our 
sample includes observations on 7,319 individuals.  
 
For this study, we question if and how individuals alter behaviors with the knowledge that they 
have diabetes and take medication to control the disease. As such, we look at how well 
individuals conform to dietary recommendations set forth by the American Diabetes Association 
and defined in the Diabetes Food Pyramid (DFP) and their chosen level of physical activity. In 
general, diabetics are instructed to choose a diet that is rich in vegetables, fruits, whole grains, 
beans, lean meats and fiber while limiting consumption of fats and sugars. We therefore created 
several dependent variables (Table 1). For five of the six food groups
2 defined in the DFP—
grains and starches; vegetables; fruit; milk; meat and meat substitutes—the dependent variable 
for each individual is the number of servings consumed during his or her 24-hour dietary recall 
divided by the number of servings recommended for their caloric intake
3. For fat, the dependent 
variable is the percent of daily calories derived from fat. For fiber and sugar the dependent 
variable is the total grams or teaspoons divided by the number of calories consumed that day. For 
physical activity, we create a score using both the amount and intensity of time an individual 
spent being physically active in leisure time. 
 
The explanatory variables used in our econometric estimation are also described in Table 1. To 
gauge income effects, we include a household’s poverty income ratio. We also control for an 
                                           
2 The Diabetes Food Pyramid (DFP) provides no specific quantity recommendation for the sixth group, fats, sweets 
and alcohol. It is simply advised that these foods be saved for special occasions.  
3 The DFP is not completely congruent with either the previous Food Guide Pyramid (FGP) or more recent 
MyPyramid. Specifically, starches in the DFP include the categories grains, potatoes,  starchy vegetables and 
legumes as counted in the FGP; The DFP vegetables only include dark green vegetables, deep yellow vegetables and 
tomatoes; and under the FGP, cheeses are counted as a serving of meat instead of a serving of dairy.    16
individual’s level of education (less than high school, high school alone or more than high 
school) because this variable is highly predictive of income and health knowledge. We include a 
dummy variable to indicate whether or not an individual lives in a household that is owned or 
rented. Similar to other national surveys on dietary intake, there is no information on the food 
prices or expenditures. Typically, researchers have circumvented this problem by including 
geographic indicators, such as state, region or whether an individual lives in an urban or rural 
setting (Variyam, Blaylock, and Smallwood, 1996). Due to confidentiality concerns, this 
information is not released to the public. Also missing is information on household size, and 
whether or not an individual has children living in the household. Currently, we can only assess 
whether an individual is married/living with an adult partner or single.   
 
From the literature, we know that some characteristics correlate with shifts in food demand. For 
example, two individuals’ energy requirements may differ because of age, gender and size. 
Rather than BMI, we use an individual’s measured waist circumference relative to the gender 
specific overweight classification (88cm for women, 102 cm for men). Cultural norms and level 
of acculturation also have an influence on our diet (Aldrich and Variyam, 2000). We attempt to 
capture these through an individual’s reported ethnicity and whether a language other than 
English is considered to be one’s primary language.  
 
We define an individual as having diabetes if, in the questionnaire regarding medical conditions, 
he or she indicates that he has been diagnosed with the disease. We also include a dummy 
variable to indicate if an individual currently takes either insulin or blood sugar pills for this 
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condition. As mentioned earlier, this variable is endogenous. Possible instruments could include 
whether any blood relatives had been diagnosed with any related health problems. A blood 
relative’s health is most arguably an exogenous variable; we have very little control over whether 
or not a grandparent had a heart condition. It may also be highly correlated with our own health 
and level of health information; our family’s health history is a strong predictor of our own 
health and watching a family member struggle with ill health may provide motivation to adopt 
healthier practices. 
 
Prices of medication could also serve as additional instruments (Park and Davis, 2001). Due to 
data limitations, however, we simply use whether or not an individual currently has health 
insurance as proxies for prices. Additionally, having health insurance should also increase the 
probability that an individual is aware of his or her health condition. Finally, we use whether or 
not an individual was diagnosed with diabetes as an adolescent or younger (age 18 or below). 
This is meant to be a proxy, albeit imperfect, for whether or not an individual has Type I or Type 
II diabetes. Individuals with Type I (also called juvenile diabetes) almost always need to take 
insulin while individuals with Type II (or adult on-set diabetes) can often manage their 
symptoms through lifestyle changes alone.   
 
Results 
Results of the treatment effects estimations are presented in Tables 2. Looking across the intake 
and other behavior equations, the sign pattern on the variable labeled “diabetic” suggests that 
people do respond to being told they are diabetic. For those told they are diabetic, signs are 
negative for intake of all foods and nutrients: starches, milk, meat, fat, sugar, vegetables, fruit,   18
and fiber. Similarly, signs on the diabetes variable on use of cigarettes and alcohol are also 
negative. However, for many of the behaviors, we find there is no significant correlation between 
being diagnosed with diabetes and healthful behaviors. The only statistically significant 
differences are that diabetics are estimated to eat less added sugar and to eat fewer servings of 
dairy products. Not surprisingly, the diabetes variable in the physical activity and waist size 
equations are also statistically insignificant. At most, the diabetes variables hint at the possibility 
of some limited behavioral changes in response to being informed about diabetes status. Even 
when armed with the knowledge of both how and why to adopt a healthier lifestyle, many 
individuals choose not to make significant changes. 
 
The more compelling results are those related to medication. We do find a statistically significant 
relationship between diabetes medication and an individual’s behavior. We find that diabetics on 
medication consume more added sugar, more total fat, more starchy foods, more dairy products, 
and more meat. While the coefficient of medication on fiber intake is positive, it is clear that the 
additional fiber intake is not coming from sources health professionals recommend; coefficients 
of medication on vegetable and fruit intake are negative, albeit insignificant. The waist size 
equation corroborates the intake equations: in the waist size equation, the medication coefficient 
is positive and statistically significant.  
 
The estimated coefficients suggest far bigger behavioral changes than what is usually described 
as offsetting behavior. Peltzman (2004) concluded that the 1970s mandated safety equipment for 
automobiles encouraged more risky driving.  The additional deaths of pedestrians, bicyclists, and 
motorcyclists completely offset the safety benefits to automobile occupants.  In our study, for   19
intake of starches, milk, meat, fat, and sugar, estimated coefficients on medication variables 
appear to be an order of magnitude larger than diabetic variables. That is, medication is 
consistent with a considerable loss of restraint in making dietary choices. 
 
Conclusion 
The policy question raised by this analysis depends on whether diabetics’ perceived health 
production functions are correct.  One possibility is that diabetics have generally overassessed 
the productivity of medicine, guessing that medicine adds so much to their health stock that they 
are healthier than non-diabetics.  As long as they do not recognize the mistake, their utility 
maximizing choices could be to diets and lifestyles that are even worse (for health) than the diets 
and lifestyles they chose before discovering their compromised health condition.  In that case, 
the public health community could consider focusing attention on accurately portraying the 
health benefits of medication.   
 
Of course, the continued development of new and superior medications could alter the situation.  
Overassessments could decline if diabetics adopted better drugs without revising their perceived 
health production functions.  However, the more likely scenario is that better drugs would be 
perceived as better, leading to upward revisions in perceived health production functions.  Thus, 
the magnitude of overconfidence might not be reduced; the more-than-offsetting behavior could 
continue, albeit with ambiguous health implications. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics  
Category Variable Name Definition and units Mean Std. Err.
Dependent Variables Fiber Grams of fiber  0.008 0.000
Sugar Teaspoons of added sugar 0.009 0.000
Total Fat Percent of calories from fat 0.331 0.003
Starch startch servings 0.966 0.010
Vegetables Vegetable servings 0.300 0.009
Fruit Fruit servings 0.585 0.024
Milk Dairly servings 0.394 0.012
Meat  Meat servings 1.206 0.014
Cigarettes Average cigarette intake 3.124 0.228
Alcohol Average alcoholic beverages when drinking 1.979 0.064
Waist
Ratio of waist circumference (in centimeters) to 
gender specific overweight classification (88cm for 
women, 102 cm for men) 0.992 0.004
Physical Activity
Physical activity coefficient-Ranges form 1 if 
sedentary to 1.45(1.48 for men) if very active 1.323 0.010
Explanatory Variables for behaviors PIR Poverty Index Ratio 3.325 0.069
Homeowner 1 if living in household owned home; zero otherwise 0.719 0.016
Less than high school
1 if individual did not complete high school; zero 
otherwise 0.129 0.009
More than high school
1 if individual went to school beyond high school; 
zero otherwise 0.633 0.017
Single 1 if unmarried; zero otherwise 0.319 0.015
Age Age in years 43.960 0.453
Female 1 if female; zero otherwise 0.473 0.007
Black, Non-Hispanic 1 if black, non-Hispanic; 0 otherwise 0.075 0.009
Hispanic 1 if Hispanic; 0 otherwise 0.112 0.018
Other Ethnicity 1 if other ethnicity; 0 otherwise 0.035 0.006
Spanish
1 if Spanish is the primary language spoken at home; 
zero otherwise 0.044 0.009
Other language
1 if neither English or Spanish are the primary 
languages spoken at home; zero otherwise 0.035 0.005
Diabetic 1 if diabetic; zero otherwise 0.048 0.003
Treatment Variable Medication 1 if taking insulin or blood sugar pills; zero otherwise 0.038 0.003
Explanatory variables for treatment Insurance 1 if individual has health insurance; zero otherwise 0.854 0.010
Relative with diabetes 1 if relative with diabetes; zero otherwise 0.495 0.011
Proxy for type 1
1 if individual was diagnosed with diabetes before 19 
yrs; zero otherwise 0.004 0.0008 Table 2: Estimation Results 














Diabetic -0.230 -0.42 -0.244 -2.37 ** -0.350 -0.49 -2.420 -0.44 -3.741 -2.05 ** 0.047 1.85 *
Medication 6.413 9.86 ** 2.409 16.82 ** 7.673 10.82 ** 70.942 10.53 ** 29.487 15.42 ** 0.275 10.27 **
PIR 0.024 0.56 -0.005 -0.29 8.812 15.24 ** 0.658 1.67 * -1.025 -5.7 ** -0.011 -5.33 **
Homeowner 0.064 0.41 -0.077 -1.79 * -0.022 -0.15 1.185 0.83 0.667 0.69 0.004 0.74
Less than high school -0.322 -1.66 * -0.004 -0.08 -0.107 -0.95 -5.220 -3.98 ** 0.255 0.29 -0.001 -0.18
More than high school 0.033 0.25 0.073 1.38 -0.168 -1.63 -2.719 -1.72 * -1.337 -1.78 * -0.011 -1.65 *
Single 0.051 0.31 0.026 0.72 0.013 0.08 2.748 1.63 0.022 0.03 -0.002 -0.32
Age -0.039 -2.12 ** -0.001 -0.23 0.053 2.69 ** 0.644 3.36 ** -0.436 -4.75 ** 0.010 11.72 **
Age2 0.000 -0.15 0.000 0.49 -0.001 -4.79 ** -0.011 -6 ** 0.001 1.53 0.000 -9.82 **
Female -2.267 -20.93 ** -0.150 -4.16 ** -2.480 -22.51 ** -26.453 -22.59 ** -5.678 -10.31 ** 0.072 18.51 **
Black, Non-Hispanic -1.028 -5.12 ** -0.468 -10.45 ** 0.426 2.46 ** -7.245 -3.25 ** 0.655 0.75 0.000 0.05
Hispanic 0.106 0.52 -0.121 -1.93 * -0.343 -1.51 -5.615 -2.57 ** -2.140 -2.72 ** -0.006 -0.75
Other Ethnicity -0.584 -1.73 * -0.473 -4.76 ** -0.309 -0.8 -20.009 -6.88 ** -1.233 -0.56 -0.024 -0.98
Spanish 0.237 1.11 -0.068 -0.95 0.022 0.07 -6.580 -2.38 ** -4.099 -4.13 ** -0.028 -3.07 **
Other language 0.384 1.11 0.042 0.5 0.026 0.08 -7.771 -1.72 * -7.562 -4.83 ** -0.073 -5.03 **
Constant 12.952 19.71 ** 1.158 7.62 ** 1.584 0.14 117.278 19.66 ** 50.088 0.00 ** 0.666 30.49 **














Diabetic -0.005 -0.05 -0.049 -0.2 -0.146 -0.14 -1.150 -1.21 0.100 1.36 -0.374 -1.39
Medication -0.048 -0.22 -0.099 -0.42 2.373 0.26 -0.028 -0.03 0.006 1.5 -0.556 -1.72 *
PIR 0.035 2.32 ** 0.113 4.35 ** 0.400 4.07 ** -0.629 -5.22 ** 0.006 1.5 0.034 0.77
Homeowner -0.075 -1.83 * -0.202 -2.4 ** -0.487 -1.67 * -1.530 -4.09 ** 0.028 1.39 -0.345 -3.37 **
Less than high school -0.073 -2.00 ** -0.326 -4.58 ** -1.036 -2.91 ** 1.078 2.73 ** -0.029 -1.39 0.286 2.52 **
More than high school 0.206 5.05 ** 0.283 4.3 ** 1.529 5.30 ** -2.782 -7.38 ** -0.020 -1.31 -0.411 -4.21 **
Single 0.026 0.56 -0.001 -0.02 0.058 0.21 1.105 3.74 ** 0.051 2.52 ** 0.453 4.24 **
Age 0.015 2.76 ** 0.004 0.37 0.140 4.25 ** 0.382 8.93 ** -0.008 -1.7 * -0.053 -3.91 **
Age2 0.000 -2.69 ** 0.000 1.79 * -0.001 -3.69 ** -0.004 -10.90 ** 0.000 1.45 0.000 1.00
Female -0.106 -3.48 ** -0.166 -3.42 ** -3.939 -14.74 ** -1.163 -4.90 ** -0.086 -7.91 ** -1.220 -14.21 **
Black, Non-Hispanic -0.168 -3.69 ** 0.237 2.6 ** -2.673 -7.43 ** -3.159 -9.23 ** 0.008 0.44 -0.738 -4.76 **
Hispanic -0.075 -1.27 0.259 2.64 ** 0.974 2.63 ** -3.358 -5.26 ** 0.004 0.12 0.153 0.90
Other Ethnicity -0.241 -1.79 * -0.107 -0.54 -2.734 -3.54 ** -1.528 -3.81 ** -0.034 -1.05 -0.190 -0.61
Spanish 0.038 0.59 0.536 4.55 ** 3.049 8.18 ** -2.846 -4.19 ** -0.044 -1.12 -0.027 -0.12
Other language 0.344 2.23 ** 1.271 4.93 ** 2.431 3.83 ** -2.033 -3.70 ** 0.006 0.2 -0.645 -2.52 **
Constant 0.811 5.42 ** 0.789 2.76 ** 16.827 16.00 ** 3.351 3.330 ** 1.615 14.62 ** 6.178 11.41 **  
*Parameter estimated to be significant at the 10% level. 
**Parameter estimated to be significant at the 5% level 
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